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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Wesly Standley appeals from the order summarily dismissing his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Standley pled guilty to possession of heroin with the intent to deliver and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of life, with 15 years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed
Standley on supervised probation for 10 years. (R., pp.186-193 .) Less than two months later, the
state filed a motion to revoke probation, alleging that Standley had violated the conditions of his
probation by: Count 1) having unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who
were both under IDOC supervision; and Count 2) violating "General Condition #15 and/or Special
Condition #( e) ... by failing to take his Suboxone medication as prescribed, and therefore failing
to participate in the Suboxone Program with Dr. Had[l]ock as ordered by the Court." (R., pp.199201.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found Standley in violation of Count 2,
but not in violation of Count 1. (R., p.234.)
The state subsequently filed a second motion to revoke probation, alleging only that
Standley had violated the conditions of his probation by having contact with Danielle Schreiner
and Matt Lewis, who were both known felons and under IDOC supervision. (R., pp.236-238.)
Following a second evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Standley had violated the
conditions of his probation by having unapproved contact with probationer Danielle Schreiner, but
not Matt Lewis. (R., pp.254-255, 331-332 (Tr., p.157, L.19 - p.159, L.20).) At the disposition
hearing for Standley's probation violations, the district court revoked Standley's probation and
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ordered the underlying sentence executed. (R., pp.256-260.) Standley filed a notice of appeal
timely from the district court's order revoking probation. (R., pp.271-274.)
On appeal, Standley argued that "the district court abused its discretion by revoking
probation and imposing his underlying sentence.

He also argue[ d] there was not sufficient

evidence that he violated special condition (e) of his probation agreement[,]" which alleged he
failed to take his Suboxone medication as prescribed. State v. Standley, 2016 WL 556365, *2
(Idaho App., Feb. 11, 2016) (unpublished opinion). The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the
district court's finding that Standley violated probation by having unapproved contact with
Danielle Schreiner was sufficient to warrant revocation of his probation and imposition of his
underlying sentence. Id. at *3. Due to its holding in regard to the "unapproved contact" probation
violation allegation, the Court concluded that it "need not address Standley's argument that there
was not sufficient evidence that he violated special condition (e) of his probation agreement." Id.
On January 4, 2017, Standley, through counsel, filed a Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief (R., pp.5-19), claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 689 (1984), because the failure to object to the re-filing of
Count 1 of the revocation motion constituted deficient performance because the allegation should
have been barred from being re-litigated under principles ofresjudicata and issue preclusion. (R.,
pp.10-12.) Standley further alleged that his trial counsel's deficient performance with regard to
Count 1 prejudiced him "because there was not sufficient evidence to prove Count II, i.e., that he
violated his special term of probation that he complete his suboxone treatment or the general term
of probation that he meaningfully participate in his suboxone treatment program." (R., p.13.)
Standley filed a Motion for Summary Disposition (R., pp.351-353), and the state filed an Answer
(R., pp.354-357). The state filed a cross-motion for summary disposition (R., pp.403-405), and
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Standley filed a response (R., pp.406-417). After a hearing on the respective summary disposition
motions, the district court entered a written Order and a Judgment granting the state's cross-motion
for summary disposition. (R., pp.418-430.)
Standley filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., pp.431-432), which was denied
with one modification (R., pp.469-4 71 ). The comi reversed its "holding that the res judicata claim
is barred because it could have been raised on appeal[,]" based on the state's failure to raise that
issue in its cross-motion and argue it to the court. (R., pp.469-470.) The court retained its "prior
ruling that for purposes of res judicata, no final judgment was entered on the first probation
revocation hearing[,]" and stood "by its prior ruling that there was sufficient evidence to support
a probation violation on Count II." (R., p.470.) Standley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp.472-475.)

3

ISSUES
Standley states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the court en in dismissing the petition because there was a material question
of fact whether counsel's performance was deficient?
2. Did the court err in dismissing the petition because there was a material question
of fact whether Mr. Standley was prejudiced by the deficient performance?
3. Did the court abuse its discretion in failing to rule on the motion for judicial
notice?
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Standley failed to show that the district court ened in summarily dismissing his postconviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the re-filing
of Count 1 of the probation violation motion? Additionally, has Standley failed to show
any abuse of discretion in the district court's failure to rule on his motion to take judicial
notice of iComi dockets?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Standley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His PostConviction Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Object To The Re-filing
Of Count 1 Of The Probation Revocation Motion
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Standley contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-

conviction claim that his probation hearing counsel provided constitutionally ineffective
assistance. 1 (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-22.) Standley specifically alleges: (1) his probation hearing
counsel was deficient for failing to object on resjudicata grounds to the re-filing of Count 1 of the
state's motion to revoke his probation (id., pp.12-18), and (2) counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced him "because there was not sufficient evidence to prove Count II" (id., p.19). 2 Standley
also argues that the district court "abused its discretion in failing to rule on the Motion to Take
Judicial Notice." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) Standley's arguments fail.

1

To date, neither the Idaho Court of Appeals nor the Idaho Supreme Court has addressed the
question of whether counsel in probation revocation proceedings are bound to provide
constitutionally effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment or the Idaho state constitution.
See State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278,283, 833 P.2d 911, 916 (1992) (In light of its finding that Young
had a statutory right to appointed counsel at his probation revocation hearing, the Court said it had
"no occasion to determine the parameters of the right to appointed counsel at probation revocation
proceedings under our state constitution.").
2

It should be recalled that, at the end of the first probation revocation hearing, the trial court orally
ruled that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove Count 1 (unapproved contact with
Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis), but had proven Count 2 (failure to take Suboxone medication
as prescribed, and therefore failing to participate in the Suboxone Program as ordered by the
Court). (R., p.320; see R., pp.190-192 (probation revocation motion).) The state re-filed the
allegation in Count 1 (R., pp.236-238), and, after an evidentiary hearing several months later, the
court ruled that the state presented sufficient evidence that Standley committed that violation also,
and ordered his probation revoked and his underlying sentence executed. (R., pp.256-260.)
5

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,
436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden
of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct.
App. 1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions
of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but
will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v.
State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all
matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d
108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Standley Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate

both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). "[S]trategic or
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008).
6

To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,
685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific
facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State,
125 Idaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994).
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the
underlying criminal action, the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion
in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance.
Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996). Where the alleged
deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not
have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland
test. Id.

1.

Res Judicata Does Not Apply To Rulings Made Within The Same Proceeding

Although the district court did not consider the issue, its summary dismissal of Standley's
claim that his probation hearing counsel was ineffective for failing to object on res judicata
grounds to the re-filing of the Count 1 probation violation allegation should be affirmed based on
the fact that the res judicata doctrine does not apply to rulings made in the same (or "unitary")
proceeding. Therefore, Standley's probation hearing counsel could not have provided deficient
performance by failing to object to the re-filing of the allegation based on an incorrect legal theory.
Case law conclusively shows that, unlike the "law of the case" principle, the res judicata
doctrine cannot be applied to preclude a second ruling where the initial ruling was made in the
same case or proceeding - it only applies when the initial ruling was made in a prior and distinct
7

proceeding. In Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,619 (1983), decision supplemented, 466 U.S.
144 (1984 ), the Supreme Court stated, "It is clear that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not
apply if a party moves the rendering court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its
judgment." Federal caselaw is in accord: See P. Employers Ins. Co. v. Sav-a-Lot of Winchester,
291 F.3d 392, 399 (6 th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) ("As to res judicata, that doctrine prohibits
parties from relitigating a claim that was or could have been raised in a prior action in which there
has been a final judgment on the merits."); Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch, 805 F.3d 397, 402 (8 th
Cir. 2016) (emphasis original) ("Collateral estoppel does not apply here because the CIMT issue
was not previously determined by a valid and final judgment in a prior action between Estrada and
DHS. Instead, the CIMT issue was determined at an earlier stage of the same action and was
reconsidered pursuant to the reopening of the action."); Analytical Eng'g, Inc. v. Baldwin Filters,
Inc., 425 F.3d 443, 453 (7 th Cir. 2005) (Res judicata "does not apply to a court's redetermination
of rulings made earlier in the same lawsuit."); J.E.T.S., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1196, 1199200 (Fed. Cir. 198 8) ("Since the second appeal was but a further step in the litigation of the same
case, the governing principle for determining what issues were open to the Board is not res
judicata, but the law of the case."); Thompson v. Paul, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1119 (D. Ariz. 2009)
("However, res judicata applies only when there is a second action; it does not apply to continuing
proceedings in the same litigation.").
State courts also follow the principle that res judicata does not apply to rulings made within
the same case. See Smith v. Hruby-Mills, 380 P.3d 349, 355 (Utah App. 2016) ("The elements of
res judicata assume that there has been a 'prior adjudication,' a 'first action,' or a 'first suit'; in
other words, by implication, the prior decision sought to be applied must have occurred in a case
other than the one in which a party seeks to give it effect."); State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 395
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(Kan. 2016) ("Consequently, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in this second
appeal within the same case."); Brown v. Mayor, 167 Md. App. 306, 320 (2006) ("Res judicata,
or claim preclusion, applies when a proceeding between parties involves the same cause of action
as a proceeding between the same parties in a prior case."); Fla. Dept. of Transp. v. Juliano, 801
So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001) ("Where successive appeals are taken in the same case there is no
question of res judicata, because the same suit, and not a new and different one, is involved.");
Clements v. Pearson, 352 S.W.2d 236,237 (Tenn. 1961) (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts§ 195, p. 331)
("The law of the case, however, is distinguished from res judicata, in that the law of the case ...
applies only to the one case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what
has been done in another case .... "); Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commn., 23 P.3d 43, 51
(Cal. 2001) ("In a nutshell: The doctrine oflaw of the case applies to later proceedings in the same
case. . . . The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to later litigation to give
conclusive effect to a former judgment or an issue determined in a former proceeding. (7 Witkin,
Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment,§§ 280,354, pp. 820, 915.)").
In clarifying the sequential relationship between the res judicata and "law of the case"
doctrines, in Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 366 P.3d 1246, 1258-1259 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2015),
the Washington Court of Appeals (Div. 1) explained that, within the confines of the same case,
and before it results in a final judgment, the "law of the case" doctrine applies to challenges to
successive rulings made within that case; however, after a judgment has become final, the res
judicata doctrine determines "whether a prior determination of law or fact is binding."

9

As shown by the above-described cases, the res judicata principle cannot be applied to
rulings made within the same proceeding. Only the discretionary3 doctrine of "law of the case"
can be used to challenge a ruling that runs counter to a prior ruling made in the same proceeding.
Because Standley has only claimed that his probation hearing counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the re-filing of the probation violation allegation (Count 1) on resjudicata grounds,
his claim is misplaced, and lacks any legal basis. Even though the district court did not summarily
dismiss Standley's post-conviction claim for that reason, its ruling should nonetheless be affirmed
on that correct rationale. See McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999)
(correct ruling will be affirmed on the correct legal theory); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704,
931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997).
The state recognizes that neither the state's cross-motion for summary disposition nor the
district court's order alleged or found (respectively) that the doctrine ofres Judi cata is inapplicable
to rulings made in the same (or unitary) hearing. However, providing Standley with notice of and
an opp01iunity to respond to that ground for dismissal would be futile. Idaho Code § 19-4906
authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-conviction relief when the applicant's
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor,
would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861,863,979 P.2d
1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App.
1995). If a district court decides sua sponte to dismiss a post-conviction petition, the UPCPA
requires the court to give the petitioner notice of the reasons for its contemplated dismissal and a

3

See United States v. Lacey, 89-10054-01-SAC, 1994 WL 262725, at *10 n.4 (D. Kan. May 6,
1994). ("The difference between the law of the case and resjudicata is that 'one directs discretion,
the other supersedes it and compels judgment."' (Quoting United States v. Miller, 822 F.2d 828,
832 (9 th Cir. 1987)) (quoting Southern Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319 (1922)).
10

20-day opportunity to respond. LC.§ 19-4906(b); Saykahamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321,
900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995). The purpose of the 20-day notice requirement is to give the petitioner
an opportunity to establish, by affidavit or other evidence, a material issue of fact. Fetterly v.
State, 121 Idaho 417,418,825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991) (quoting State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho
487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 (1981)) ("The purpose of the twenty (20) day notice requirement is
to give the petitioner 'an opportunity to establish a material fact issue."'). See also Garza v. State,
139 Idaho 533,537, 82 P.3d 445,449 (2003) ("A notice of intent to dismiss must state the reasons
for dismissal in order to provide an applicant with meaningful opportunity to provide further legal
authority or evidence that may demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue.").
In this case, there is no evidence or legal argument that Standley could present to establish
a genuine factual issue sufficient to overcome dismissal of his post-conviction claim based on the
inapplicability of the res judicata doctrine to a single proceeding. As shown, the law throughout
the nation uniformly limits the applicability of the resjudicata doctrine to rulings made in separate
proceedings - Standley cannot change that legal verity now or through an evidentiary hearing.
Because Standley cannot make any legal showing which would show he is entitled to relief on his
post-conviction claim, further proceedings on the claim would be futile. The district court's order
summarily dismissing the claim should be affirmed.

2.

Standley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ruling That His Trial
Counsel Was Not Deficient For Failing To Object To The Re-Filing Of The
Probation Revocation Motion On Res Judicata Grounds

In the post-conviction proceeding, Standley claimed his trial counsel's performance was
deficient for failing to object on res judicata grounds to the state re-filing and pursuing the Count
1 allegation after the trial court orally denied it. The district court summarily dismissed that claim,
holding that the trial court's oral ruling was not a "final judgment on the merits" for the purposes
11

of res judicata; therefore, the state was entitled to re-file it and pursue it at a second hearing. (R.,
pp.421-430.)
On appeal, Standley argues that the district court erred in finding that t~e "finality" required
for collateral estoppel is the same as the "finality" required for appealable orders. 4 The state relies
upon the district court's Order Granting State's Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition of Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief (id.) for its legal analysis and determination that the trial court's oral
ruling was not a "final judgment on the merits" for purposes of res judicata and incorporates that
Order, attached as Appendix A, as if fully set forth herein. In addition to adopting the district
court's analysis and conclusions, the state makes the following arguments.
Standley argues that, under State v. Dempsey, 146 Idaho 327, 193 P.3d 874 (Ct. App. 2008),
and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982), his probation hearing counsel was
deficient under Strickland for failing to object to the state re-filing Count 1 based on res judicata
grounds.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-18.)

Standley asserts that Dempsey shows that a mid-

proceeding oral decision, prior to being set forth in a written decision or judgment, can be a "final
judgment" for res judicata purposes, while not being a final judgment for appeal purposes. (Id.)
According to Standley, the trial court's denial of the probation violation in Count 1 at the first

4

In Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 885, 173 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2007) (emphasis added), the
Idaho Supreme Court stated:
The test of when collateral estoppel should apply is (1) whether the party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, (2) whether the issue decided in the
previous litigation is identical to the current issue presented, (3) whether the issue
was actually decided in the previous litigation and whether the issue was necessary
to the prior judgment, (4) whether the final judgment was on the merits and (5)
whether the party who the judgment is asserted against was a party or in privity
with the party to the prior judgment.
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probation revocation hearing was a final judgment for res judicata purposes, which legally
precluded the re-filing of that same probation violation allegation. (Id.)
In Dempsey, the probationer (Dempsey) was on probation in two cases, a 1999 case and a
2002 case. Id. at 328-329, 193 P.3d at 875-876. In 2006, the state filed motions to revoke
Dempsey's two probations for, inter alia, failure to attend and successfully complete sex offender
treatment as required by his probation officer. Id. at 328, 193 P.3d at 875. After an evidentiary
hearing in the 1999 case, the district court found Dempsey had "willfully violated the terms of his
probation by failing to participate in sex offender treatment." Id. at 329, 193 P.3d at 876. The
state then filed a motion in the 2002 case requesting the court apply the collateral estoppel doctrine
and find Dempsey in violation of his probation on that basis. To prove the probation violation in
the 2002 case, and over Dempsey's objection, the state "relied on a certified copy of an audio
recording of the oral ruling" by a different district judge in the 1999 case. Id. The court "noted
that it had listened to the audio recording and ruled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should
be applied" and found Dempsey in violation of the terms of his probation in the 2002 case. Id.
On appeal, the Dempsey Court considered "whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel
prohibits a probationer from relitigating the merits of an alleged probation violation after a trial
court has already found that the probationer violated the same term of probation in a separate
case." Dempsey, 146 Idaho at 330, 193 P.3d at 877 (emphasis added). The Court first found
persuasive two out-of-state cases that affirmed the application of collateral estoppel where an
initial finding of a probation violation by one trial court was used collaterally to prove the same
probation violation in another trial court. Id. As its main holding, the Court concluded, in essence,
that the use of collateral estoppel could preclude a probationer from relitigating the merits of a
previously found probation violation. Id.
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First and foremost, as discussed above, the res judicata doctrine does not apply to rulings
made within the same case, which Dempsey indirectly acknowledges by confining its holding to
approve the use of a probation violation ruling in one case to collaterally estop a challenge to the
same probation violation allegation in a separate case. Dempsey, 146 Idaho at 330-331, 193 P.3d
at 877-878 (also reviewing the five factors of res judicata in terms of the 1999 and 2002 cases).
On that basis alone, Standley's claim that his probation hearing counsel's performance was
deficient for failing to object to the re-filing of Count 1 - based on res judicata - must be denied.
Second, even if res judicata principles applied to rulings made in a unitary proceeding,
Standley's assertion that Dempsey shows that the oral ruling in his initial probation revocation
hearing constituted a "final judgment" for res judicata purposes in his case reads too much into
Dempsey. 5 In explaining its conclusion that the "five-factor test for application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel" had been met (see n.4, supra), and although Dempsey initially listed the fourth
factor as "whether the final judgment was on the merits," 146 Idaho at 329, 193 P.3d at 876
(emphasis added), the Court subsequently held, "Fourth, the judgment finding Dempsey in
violation of the terms of probation in the 1999 case was on the merits," id. at 331, 193 P.3d at 878.
Dempsey made no specific mention of "finality" in its conclusions, and engaged in no analysis of
how the certified audio recording of the probation violation finding in the 1999 case may have
constituted a "final" judgment on the merits. Dempsey was focused on the more general and

5

Additionally, the portions of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments that Standley cites on appeal
are very general and do not in any way suggest that the trial court's oral ruling in initially denying
Count 1 of the probation violation allegations constituted a "final judgment" for res judicata
purposes. (See Appellant's Brief, p.15 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982))
("'[a] judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to part of an action although the litigation
continues as to the rest[,]"' and "that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on
appeal [is a factor] supporting the conclusion that the decision is final for the purpose of
preclusion.").
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unsettled question of whether collateral estoppel could be applied in a separate probation violation
hearing. Id. at 330, 193 P.3d at 877 ("Idaho appellate courts have not directly addressed whether
the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits a probationer from relitigating the merits .... ").
Standley's reliance on Dempsey for his split view of "finality" (i.e., for res judicata and appeal
purposes), wherein no specific analysis or holding on that precise point was presented, is not
warranted.
Third, the Dempsey decision does not reveal whether the oral ruling in the 1999 case was
memorialized in a written judgment or order before it was used by the state to collaterally estop
Dempsey from relitigating the same issue in the 2002 case. To the extent Standley suggests his
probation hearing counsel should have obtained the Register of Actions (or the written judgments
or orders) from Dempsey's 1999 and 2002 cases to determine that the oral ruling in the 1999 case
was not final for appeal purposes (but was used for res judicata in the 2002 case), he places an
unreasonable and unnecessary standard of performance on counsel. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.1718 (arguing that the Register of Actions in Dempsey's 1999 and 2002 cases shows that the 1999
oral ruling was not "final" for appeal purposes until after it was used for collateral estoppel
purposes in the 2002 case).) Standley's (presumed) suggestion that his probation hearing counsel
should have obtained the Register of Actions and/or judgments and orders of the probation
violations in Dempsey's two cases is an indication that a reading of Dempsey was not enough to
inform his counsel that the oral ruling in Dempsey's 1999 case was presented in his 2002 case
before it was transformed into a written judgment or order

i.e., that it was treated as "final" for

res judicata purposes before it became "final" for appeal purposes. However, even if Standley's

probation hearing counsel had obtained the information to show that Dempsey's 1999 oral ruling
had not resulted in a written judgment or order before it was used for res judicata purposes, that

15

information would not have had any precedential value because it was not included in the Dempsey
decision.
Fourth, at the time of Standley's second probation revocation hearing, as is the case today,
there was no controlling Idaho authority concerning whether the state can re-file a probation
violation allegation in the same proceeding after it has been ruled unproven, but before such ruling
has been reduced to a written order. Because the law was, and remains, unsettled on this issue,
Standley's trial counsel could not have been deficient for failing to object to the re-filing of Count
1 of the probation revocation motion based on res judicata. Although the district court did not
base its ruling that Standley's probation hearing counsel's performance was not deficient on that
rationale, its ruling should be affirmed on that alternative ground. 6 See McKinney, 133 Idaho at
700, 992 P.2d at 149; Avelar, 129 Idaho at 704, 931 P.2d at 1222.
The Sixth Amendment did not require Standley's attorney to blaze new trails and pursue a
motion or objection on a novel issue that had not been decided by the Idaho appellate courts,
particularly where there is compelling law throughout the United States that holds, contrary to
Standley's claim, that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to rulings made in the same
proceeding. In sum, the district court properly held that Standley failed to show his probation

6

There is no notice problem. While a post-conviction petitioner is entitled to notice prior to the
summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims from either the court or from the state's motion
to dismiss, I.C. § 19-4906; Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522-523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1282-1283
(2010), an order of summary dismissal may be affirmed on appeal on the grounds asserted in the
state's motion to dismiss if no material issue of fact on those grounds is contained in the record.
See Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho
859, 864-865, 243 P.3d 675, 680-681 (Ct. App. 2010). In this case, the state's cross-motion for
summary disposition explained that "[t]he specific grounds for dismissal ... are as set forth" in its
supporting brief (R., p.404), which, in turn, stated, "There is no bar to refiling the allegation.
Therefore, no legal basis exists to sustain the objection Petitioner claims his counsel should have
made" (R., p.387). The summary dismissal of this claim should be affirmed on the alternative
ground that Standley failed to show that any law precluded the state from re-filing Count 1.
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hearing counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, by not challenging the re-filing of the probation violation alleged in Count 1.

3.

Standley Has Failed To Demonstrate Prejudice That Resulted From Any Deficiency

Standley argues:
[He] was prejudiced under Strickland by defense counsel's failure to object
to the relitigation of Count I because there was insufficient evidence to show he
violated Count II. And, in the absence of sufficient evidence of either probation
violation, the court could not have validly found a probation violation, revoked the
probation, or imposed the sentence. Even if it had, Mr. Standley could have
presented the issue on appeal and prevailed.
(Appellant's Brief, p.22.)
Under Strickland, Standley must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon, 114
Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Cowger, 132 Idaho at 685,978 P.2d at 244. However, Standley's
argument severely alters the Strickland standard for "prejudice." 7 Standley does not even attempt
to demonstrate, as he must, that, absent counsel's allegedly deficient performance with regard to
Count 1 during the second probation revocation hearing, the district court would not have revoked
his probation and ordered his sentence executed based on Count 2 - the lone proven probation
violation. Instead, Standley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count 2 as if
this is a direct appeal of the district court's probation violation rulings. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.19-22.) Standley has not presented any argument that he is entitled to modify the Strickland
prejudice test in that way; therefore, his argument should not be considered. See Murray v. State,
156 Idaho 159,168,321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263,923

7

The probation violation allegations of Count 1 (unapproved contact) and Count 2 (failing to
participate in the Suboxone Program as ordered by the Court) are not directly related. (See R.,
pp.199-201.)
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P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not be considered if "either authority or argument is
lacking" and declining to consider appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single
authority or legal proposition to support his argument").
Regardless of the lack of authority supporting Standley' s prejudice argument, even if his
counsel had successfully objected to the re-filing of Count 1 on res judicata grounds after the first
revocation hearing, such objection would have had absolutely no impact on the court's prior
determination that he violated his probation as alleged in Count 2. Nonetheless, in the event this
Court deems it necessary to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the probation
violation alleged in Count 2, for its response to that issue the state incorporates and relies upon, as
if fully set forth herein, its Respondent's Brief filed with this Court in the direct appeal that
followed the district court's order finding Standley in violation of probation, revoking his
probation, and executing his underlying sentence, which is attached hereto as Appendix B. The
state also relies upon for its response, as if fully set forth herein, the district court's Order Granting
State's Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

(R.,

pp.421-430 (Appendix A).)
The only remaining question then, one that was not addressed by Standley below or in this
appeal, is whether the district court's determination that Standley violated his probation solely as
alleged in Count 2 would have resulted in the same outcome of revocation and execution of
sentence. In that regard, the state notes that, as sentencing, the district judge informed Standley as
follows:
The underlying sentence in this case is a sentence of life in the Idaho State
Penitentiary, 15 years fixed, and indeterminate life. That sentence is suspended,
and you are on probation for a period of ten years. So hear out what I'm saying
here. You come back on a probation violation, you 're gone. You are locked up for
a long time. I intend that. Because I'm not going to gamble with you.
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(R., p.306 (Tr., p.55, Ls.8-14) (emphasis added).) At the end of the sentencing hearing, the district
judge said, "I'm here to tell you, Mr. Standley, that is, in fact, a zero-tolerance probation." (R.,
p.307 (Tr., p.58, Ls.6-7).)
During the disposition hearing on Standley's probation violations, the district court found
on the record that the probation violations were willful and reiterated that he had "made it
absolutely clear that this was a no-tolerance probation." (R., pp.336 (Tr., p.177, Ls.10-11); 337
(Tr., p.179, Ls.12-13).) Although the district judge did not discuss Standley's violation of Count
2 in any detail, the record makes it apparent that, as a "zero-tolerance" probation, any probation
violation would have resulted in the court revoking his probation and executing his underlying
sentence. Standley cannot show that, pursuant to Strickland, there is a reasonable probability that,
absent counsel's alleged deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Cowger, 132 Idaho at 685,978 P.2d at 244.

4.

Standley Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's
Failure To Rule On His Motion To Take Judicial Notice Of iCourt Dockets

After the district court entered its Order Granting State's Cross-Motion for Summary
Disposition of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (R., pp.421-430 (Appendix A)), Standley filed
a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., pp.431-432) with a supporting memorandum with the
following attached exhibits: (1) Exhibit A- the iCourt docket for State v. Shawn Dempsey, Ada
Co. No. CR-FE-1999-1070, and (2) Exhibit B - the iCourt docket for State v. Shawn Dempsey,
Ada Co. No. CR-FE-2002-617 (R., pp.433-460). The state filed a response (R., pp.461-463), and
Standley filed a reply (R., pp.464-466). A few days later, Standley filed a Motion to Take Judicial
Notice of the iCourt dockets in the two above- described cases in which Shawn Dempsey was the
named defendant. (R., pp.467-471.) About one week later, the district court entered its Order

19

Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which made no mention of Standley's Motion to
Take Judicial Notice. (R., pp.469-471.) Standley did not file any request or motion for an order
or ruling on his motion for judicial notice.
On Appeal, Standley argues that (1) under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d), the district court
had "a mandatory duty ... to take judicial notice when a party makes an oral or written request,"
and (2) the failure of the court to rule on his motion requires reversal because the court violated a
mandatory duty.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.23-24.) Standley's argument fails for the following

reasons.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d), under Rule 201 's general heading of "Judicial notice of
adjudicative facts," reads:
(d) When mandatory. When a party makes an oral or written request that a court
take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file in the same
or a separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items for which
the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all partaies
[sic) copies of such documents or items. A court shall take judicial notice if
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.
(Emphasis added.)

It should be apparent that the iCourt docket lists Standley requested are not "records,
exhibits or transcripts from the court file" of each case. The iCourt dockets are simply listings or
summaries of actions taken in those cases compiled by an outside source; they are not "records,
exhibits or transcripts," nor are they "from the court file." Therefore, the district court did not
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have any mandatory obligation to take judicial notice of them. 8
Also, it is well-established that the appellate courts ofldaho "will not review a trial court's
alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the
assignment of error." State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993). See also
State v. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, _ , 402 P.3d 1073, 1081 (2017); State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,
442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008). Rather than file a motion for a ruling on his Motion to Take
Judicial Notice, Standley elected to raise this issue in the appellate court. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.23-24.) Because his choice deprived the trial court of its opportunity to rule on the merits of
his request, Standley has failed to show that his claim of error can be addressed on appeal in the
absence of an adverse ruling on his motion.
Lastly, even if this Court determines that the district court erred in not ruling on Standley's
Motion to Take Judicial Notice, such error was harmless. See Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho
508, 517, 248 P.3d 1243, 1252 (2011) ("[W]e find that any error the district court committed in
failing to take judicial notice of documents from case CV-2007-24 was necessarily harmless.").
The fact that Standley attached the iCourt dockets for the two Dempsey cases to his Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., pp.433-460), shows that they were included
in the record below, and presumably considered (R., pp.433-460; see R., p.431 ("This motion is
based upon the files and records in this case"); p.469 (Order denying Motion to Alter or Amend

8

Standley's reliance on State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 727, 852 P.2d 87, 93 (1993), is misplaced.
In Tribe, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that the trial court had a mandatory duty to instruct
the jury on a lesser included offense to first degree murder (second degree torture murder), and
because that mandatory duty was not unambiguously waived by the defendant, the failure to give
such instruction constituted reversible error. Id. The failure to give a required and pivotal jury
instruction in a murder case is not on par with the failure to rule on a motion to take judicial notice
of documents that may, or may not be, germane to the outcome of a case.
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Judgment acknowledging the filing of the Motion to Amend (etc.) and its supporting memorandum
- which was appended with the iCourt exhibits).)

Moreover, based on the prior arguments

presented in this brief in sections C-1 through C-4, any error by the district court in failing to rule
on Standley's Motion to Take Judicial Notice is harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order summarily
dismissing Standley's post-conviction petition.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2018.

Isl John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of February, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy to:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
at the following email addresses: db@nbmlaw.com and lm@nbmlaw.com.

Isl John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
JCMldd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTI! JUDICIAL D J S T R I ~1~~: ..
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
WESLEY STANDLEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-42-17-0015

ORDER GRANTING STATE'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

I.

BACKGROUND
The Petitioner pled guilty to the crime of possession of heroin with the intent to deliver in
Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2014-1232. The Court imposed a life sentence with fifteen
years determinate, but suspended the sentence and placed the Petitioner on ten years' probation.
One of the conditions of probation was that the Petitioner "shall not associate with any person(s)
designated by any agent ofIDOC." R.p.176. Another condition required Petitioner to
"meaningfully participate in and successfully complete any treatment, counseling or other
programs deemed beneficial to the Defendant and as directed by the Court or any agent of the
IDOC." R.174.
The State later filed a motion to revoke probation alleging probation violations of the two
conditions. R.191. Count I of the motion alleged Petitioner had "unapproved contact with
Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who are both under IDOC supervision." Id. Count II
alleged Petitioner was "failing to take Suboxone medication as prescribed. And therefore failing
to participate in the Suboxone Program with Dr. Hadlock as ordered by the Court." Id. The
Petitioner entered denials to both counts. R.207.
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR
POST-CONV1CTION RELIEF
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Following an evidentiary hearing, the Court found that the State did not prove Count I
because it failed to present evidence that the Petitioner was apprised of the probation condition
that he was not to associate with any person designated by an agent ofIDOC. Tr.p.103. The
Court rule~ that although the probation terms and conditions acknowledged by the Petitioner
were filed as part of the State's motion they were not presented as part of the hearing. Id. The
Court declined the State's request to reopen the case, noting that:
The provision that is alleged to have been violated is number 24 of the general
conditions. Mr. Standley acknowledged or says, the defendant shall not associate
with any persons designated by any agent of !DOC. The allegation is that he had
unauthorized contact. What's lacking in this case is evidence that he was told of
this condition, and maybe we do this case again. I don't know. That's your
choice. But I am not going to find that he is in violation of Count I because the
State has simply not presented substantial evidence on that allegation.
Tr.p.112.
As to Count II, the Court found the Petitioner in violation of the condition of probation
for failing to take Suboxone as prescribed by Dr. Hadlock, the physician who administered the
Suboxone treatment program. In finding the Petitioner in violation of his probation on Count II,
the Court ruled:
So there were two components of that order. One component is if he quits, he
violates probation, no question about it. And second, that he complete the
program. Well, there is no question in my mind that Mr. Standley has not
followed that program like he was directed. I don't care whether Officer
Neumeyer. thinks it's a violation or not. The question is wheter I think it is a
violation. And clearly failing to follow the prescribed routine of taking two
Suboxones a day was the deal. It's not up to Mr. Standley to make that decision.
I could ·care less whether 90 percent or a hundred percent of the world failed
under these programs and failed to follow the instructions. That's not the issue.
The issue is you were told what to do. You made a different decision. That isn't
a medical issue. It is an issue, Mr. Standley, very simply that you on your own
decided to change the program. That violates the probation, and you are in fact,
in violation of probation on Count 2.
Tr.p.113. After the evidentiary hearing and prior to the disposition hearing, the State filed a
second Ex Parle Motion to Revoke Probation. R.227. The single count alleged that the
Petitioner had "unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who are both
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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known felons under IDOC supervision." R228. The allegation was substantially similar to the
original Count I that the Court previously detennined the State had failed to prove.
The second probation violation motion proceeded to evidentiary hearing without
objection from defense counsel. After hearing additional evidence, the Court took judicial notice
of the general condition of probation #24, prohibiting the Petitioner from associating with any
person designated by the IDOC. The Court found the Petitioner violated the probation condition
by having prohibited contact with Danielle Schreiner but not as to Matt Lewis. Tr.p.159. At the

disposition hearing on both probation violations, the Court revoked the Petitioner's probation
and imposed the underlying sentence. Tr.p.181. The Court then issued an Order on Motion to
Revoke Probation and Order of Commitment from which petitioner appealed. R.262

On appeal, the Petitioner raised two issues. That the district court abused discretion by

revoking his probation and that there was insufficient evidence that he violated special condition
(e) of his probation. 1 The Court of Appeals affinned in an ~published opinion. State v.

Standley, 2016 WL 556365, *1-2 (Idaho Ct.App.2016). However, after affirming on the first

issue, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to reach the second issue. Id. at 3. The abovecaptioned proceeding was initiated on January 4, 2017, when the Petitioner filed a Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief("Petition"). The Petitioner subsequently filed aMotionfor
Summary Disposition. The State then filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition. Oral

argwnent on the Motions was held on April 7, 2017.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, entirely distinct from the
underlying criminal action. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 2 P.3d 110 (2001). The applicant
1

Special condition ( e) provided:
Substance abuse treatment: The defendant shall complete the Suboxone program that he is
currently enrolled in through Dr. David R. Hadlock's office. If the defendant quits the program
prior to the completion date as recommended by Dr. Hadlock, such conduct shall constitute a
probation violation.

R.168.
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must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907. An application for post-conviction relief differs from
a complaint in an ordinary civil action in that it must contain much more than "a short and plain
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(l). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting
evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the application

must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the
application will be subject to dismissal. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 915, 935 P.2d 174, 178

1

(Ct. App. 1996).

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative, "when it
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." As such, summary
dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief is the procedural equivalent of summary
judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664,667,
152 P.3d 25, 28 (2006).
Ill.
ANALYSIS

In his Petition, the Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his state and federal
constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel during his probation revocation
proceedings. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). In order to demonstrate the attorney's
performance was deficient, a petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. · Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In doing so, a petitioner
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITTON OF PETITION FOR
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must overcome a strong presumption that counsel was competent and diligent in his or her
representation of the petitioner. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271
(2010). To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for
the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Kuehl
v. State, 145 Idaho 607,610, 181 P.3d 533,536 (Ct. App. 2008).

A,

The Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unavailing as a matter of
law.

Petitioner asserts that the issue preclusion aspect ofres judicata precluded the Court from
conducting the second evidentiary hearing. Petitioner contends that counsel's failure to object to
the second evidentiary hearing constituted deficient performance falling below an objective
standard of reasonableness under Strickland. Petitioner contends counsel's failure to object was
prejudicial because the outcome of the proceedings would have been different as the State would
have failed to prove that he violated his probation on either count as there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of a probation violation on Count II. This Court disagrees for
several reasons.
1.

The issue of whether res judicata applies to probation revocation proceedings
could have been raised on appeal.

The post-conviction procedure act cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. LC. § 19490 I (b). Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and
may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings. Id. In this case, Petitioner could have
raised the issue of whether principles of res judicata barred the second evidentiary hearing.
Probationers do not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendant's. State v. Dempsey, 146 Idaho 327,329, 193 P.3d 874, 776 (2008). However, a
probationer has a protected liberty interest in continuing probation and is therefore entitled to due
process before probation may be revoked. Id. Therefore, a probationey is entitled to a
meaningful hearing to determine whether probation has been violated. Id.
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In this case, the Petitioner was appropriately provided notice of the allegation against him
and afforded a meaningful evidentiary hearing on the motion. The due process requirement
enunciated in Dempsey was therefore satisfied. Nonetheless, to the extent Petitioner contends
that the failure to apply res judicata to the second proceeding violated bis fundamental right to
due process, he should have raised that issue on direct appeal. Although generally issues not
raised at the district court level are not reviewed for the first time on appeal, an exception is if an
unwaived constitutional right such as due process was plainly violated. The standard is whether
the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights, (2)
the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not
contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 2545 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). The issue raised by Petitioner in

this case falls squarely within the standard. Conversely, to the extent the Court's failure to apply
res judicata did not result in violating Petitioner's right to due process there was no error in
conducting the second evidentiary hearing. Absent error, counsel's failure to object would not
have altered the outcome of the proceedings.
2.

The requirements of res judicata were not satisfied in this case.

Next, even if the issue was not waived for failure to raise it on direct appeal, the
requirements for establishing res judicata were not met in this case. In Dempsey, the Idaho Court
of Appeals held that issue preclusion or collateral estoppel could be applied in probation
revocation proceedings. Id. at 331, 193 P.2d at 878. In Dempsey, a probationer was sentenced to
probation in separate cases in two different courts. The core terms and conditions of both
probations were identical. Id. at 328, 193 P.2d at 875. Following an evidentiary hearing
conducted in the first case, the probationer was adjudged to have violated a term of bis probation.
Id. at 329, 193 P.2d at 876. The State then filed a motion to revoke probation in the second case

before a different judge. Id. The State requested that the court apply the doctrine of collateral
estoppel and find that the probationer violated the identical term of bis probation ordered in the
second case based on the same conduct adjudged in the first case. Id. The district court applied
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collatera1 estoppel and found the probationer in violation of his probation based on the
determination in the first case. Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that issue preclusion or collateral estoppel
could be applied in a probation revocation proceeding setting forth a five factor test:
(1) whether the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2)
whether the issue decided in the previous litigation is identical to the current issue
presented; (3) whether the issue was actually decided in the previous litigation
and whether the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; (4) whether the.final
judgment was on the merits; and (5) whether the party who the judgment is
asserted against was a party or in privity with the party to the prior judgment.

Id. at 328, 193 P.2d at 876 (citing Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882,885, 173 P.3d 1141, 1144
2

(2007) (emphasis added). In affirming, the Court of Appeals determined that the circumstances
of the case satisfied the five factor test for the application of collateral estoppel. Id. at 331, 193
P.2d at 878.

In the instant case the five factor test was not satisfied as no final judgment on the merits
had been entered until after the second evidentiary hearing and the disposition hearing. The
Petitioner argues that final judgment occurred when the Court found the State failed to prove
Count I at the conclusion of the first evidentiary hearing. This Court disagrees. The final
judgment is what triggers the time for appeaL Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC,
148 Idaho 616,621,226 P.2d 163, 1267 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court has instructed that an
appeal filed prior to entry of final judgment is considered premature and only becomes valid
upon entry of final judgment. Id. Final judgment was entered in this matter when the Court
issued the Order on Motion to Revoke Probation and Order of Commitment. R..247. In
accordance with I.C.R. 33(a)(3) and I.A.R. 14(a), the Order advised the Petitioner of his right to
appeal from the probation revocation proceedings. R.250. The time for filing an appeal ran
from the entry of the Order and that is the Order from which the Petitioner timely appealed.
Accordingly, since res judicata did not apply to the second evidentiary hearing, counsel's
performance was not deficient for failing to object.
2

Idaho Courts have made it abundantly clear that in order for res judicata to apply a final judgment is required in the
prior litigation. See e.g. Shackelford v. State, 160 Idaho 317,324,372 P.3d 372,379 (2016), State v. Powell, 120
Idaho 707,708,819 P.2d 561,562 (1991).
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B.

The evidence was sufficient to support a probation violation on Count Il.

Lastly, the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support a violation on Count
II. When the Petitioner was placed on probation, the Court informed him that "this is a zerotolerance probation." Tr.p.58. The Court of Appeals also acknowledged that the Court infonned
the Petitioner of such. Standley, 2016 WL 556365 *3 ("court emphasized to Standley that it
would strictly enforce the terms of his probation"). Against this backdrop, one of the terms of
probation provided:
e. Substance abuse treatment: The defendant shall complete the Suboxone
program that he is currently enrolled in through Dr. David R. Hadlock's office. If
the defendant quits the program prior to the completion date as recommended by
Dr. Hadlock, such conduct shall constitute a probation violation.

R.168. In conjunction with the treatment program, the Petitioner entered into an Agreement for
Treatment with Buprenorhine. State's Ex. 2. A term of that Agreement provided:

I agree to take the medication onlv as prescribed. The indicated dose should be
taken daily as prescribed by the doctor. The patient should not skip or adjust the
dose on their own. If you feel like you need a dose change you agree to call the
office and schedule an appointment to discuss this. Only Dr. Hadlock or staff can
change the way medication dose to be taken.
Id. (emphasis in original). Previously, at the sentencing hearing Dr. Hadlock testified that this
term was one of the more important terms of the Agreement.
An I.D.O.C. general term and condition of probation provided in relevant part:
Evaluation and Program Plan: Defendant shall obtain any treatment evaluation
deemed necessary as ordered by the Court or requested by any agent of !DOC.
The Defendant shall meaningfully participate in and successfully complete any
treatment, counseling or other programs deemed beneficial to the Defendant and

as directed by the Court or any agent of the !DOC.
R.17 4 (emphasis added).
The uncontroverted evidence presented at the evidentiary bearing established that the
Petitioner failed to take the Suboxone as prescribed per the Agreement. The Petitioner was
prescribed a dose of two Suboxone strips per day. Tr.p.73. An inspection by his probation
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officer revealed that over a 22 day period when the Petitioner should have taken 44 strips, that he
had only taken IO strips and that he had the remaining excess strips in his possession. Id. The
Petitioner admitted to his probation officer that he was not taking the Suboxone as prescribed
because "he was trying to wean himself off of it." Id. When confronted the Petitioner offered a
different explanation to Dr. Hadlock explaining that he had missed taking a couple of doses
"here and there" over an eight month period and that was his reason for having the excess strips
in his possession. Tr.p.99. During the evidentiary hearing it was also established that just prior
to sentencing the Petitioner provided a Suboxone strip to another probationer. Tr.p.64. This is
after approximately eight months of being in the treatment program.
A significant component of the Petitioner's probation was that he continued with the
Suboxone medication treatment program. A significant component of the treatment program
was that the Petitioner only take the Suboxone medication in doses prescribed by his treating
physician. The Petitioner's deliberate failure to take the Suboxone medication as prescribed over
ari extended period of time without consulting his treating physician sufficiently supports the
Court's finding that the Petitioner failed to m_eaningfully participate in the treatment program.
The Petitioner's lack of candor for his failure to take the Suboxone medication as prescribed as
evidence by his conflicting explanations further supports the finding that the Petitioner was not
meaningfully participating in the treatment program as directed.

IV.
ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State ofidaho's Cross
Motion For Summary Disposition ofPetition/or Post-Conviction ReliefiB granted.

DATED~

11, '2.0l7

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby cortify that on this 1\,_ day of

IJ\h~, ,2017, I mailed (served) a tme

and correct copy of the within instrument to;
DENNIS BENJAMIN

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PROSECUTOR
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

V.
WESLEY GENE STANDLEY,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43024
Twin Falls County Case No.
CR-2014-1232

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

_______________ )

Has Standley failed to establish that the district court erred, either when it found
that he had violated his probation, or when it subsequently revoked his probation?

Standley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Standley pied guilty to possession of heroin with the intent to deliver and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with 15 years fixed, suspended the
sentence, and placed Standley on supervised probation for 10 years.

(R., pp.164-89.)

Less than two months later, the state filed a motion to revoke probation alleging that

1

Standley had violated the conditions of his probation by: Count 1) having unapproved
contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who were both under IDOC
supervision; and Count 2) violating "General Condition #15 and/or Special Condition
#(e) ... by failing to take his Suboxone medication as prescribed, and therefore failing to
participate in the Suboxone Program with Dr. Had[l]ock as ordered by the Court." (R.,
pp.190-92.)

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found Standley in

violation of Count 2, but not in violation of Count 1. (R., p.225.) The state subsequently
filed a second motion to revoke probation, alleging that Standley had violated the
conditions of his probation by having contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis,
who were both known felons and under IDOC supervision. (R., pp.227-29.) Following a
second evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Standley had violated the
conditions of his probation by having unapproved contact with probationer Danielle
Schreiner. (R., pp.245-46; Tr., p.157, L.19- p.159, L.20.) At the disposition hearing for
Standley's probation violations, the district court revoked Standley's probation and
ordered the underlying sentence executed. (R., pp .24 7-51.) Standley filed a notice of
appeal timely from the district court's order revoking probation. (R., pp.262-65.)
Standley asserts that there "was not sufficient evidence to prove that [he] violated
his special term of probation that he complete his Subox[o]ne treatment or the general
term of probation that he meaningfully participate in his Subox[o]ne treatment program"
because he was still enrolled in the program and because the treatment provider "did
not expect perfect compliance with the treatment agreement" and therefore, Standley
claims, he was "meaningfully participating" in the program. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.)

2

Standley's claim fails because the district court had sufficient evidence to find that he
was in violation of the conditions of his probation.
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if an'l of the terms and conditions
of the probation have been violated.

I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122

Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053,
1054, 775 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App.1989). A court's finding that an alleged violation has
been proved will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the finding. State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct.
App. 1994) (citing State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311,766 P.2d 781 (1988); State v. Hayes,
99 Idaho 713, 587 P.2d 1248 (1978); State v. Barton, 119 Idaho 114, 803 P.2d 1020
(Ct. App.1991 )).
Standley asserts that there "was not sufficient evidence to prove that (he] violated
his special term of probation that he complete his Subox[o]ne treatment or the general
term of probation that he meaningfully participate in his Subox[o]ne treatment program."
(Appellant's brief, p.11.)

Special Condition #(e) of Standley's probation agreement

provided:
The defendant shall complete the Suboxone program that he is currently
enrolled in through Dr. David R. Hadlock's office. If the defendant quits
the program prior to the completion date as recommended by Dr.
Hadlock, such conduct shall constitute a probation violation.
(R., p.181 (emphasis added).) Standley's agreement for Suboxone treatment with Dr.
David R. Hadlock included the following condition for program participation:
I agree to take the medication only as prescribed. The indicated
dose should be taken daily as prescribed by the doctor. The patient
should not skip or adjust the dose on their own. If you feel like you need a
dose change you agree to call the office and schedule an appointment to

3

discuss this. Only Dr. Hadlock or staff can change the way medication
dose to be taken [sic].
(Exhibits, p.40 1 (emphasis original).) Standley wrote his initials on the line next to this
condition and signed the agreement, indicating he had read and understood the
agreement in its entirety and that he would "totally comply with all aspects and
conditions of this agreement contract." (Exhibits, pp.40A2 (emphasis original).) In

the report of probation violation, Standley's probation officer reported:
Per Mr. Standley's program contract he was to take all of his medications
as prescribed. It was determined that Mr. Standley was not taking his
[S]uboxone as prescribed. Mr. Standley was prescribed to take 2
[S)uboxone strips per day and had only taken 10 in the previous 22 days.

(R., p.194.) As such, Standley not only violated his treatment contract with Dr. Hadlock,
but he also quit the Suboxone program when he took it upon himself stop taking the
Suboxone, which was not recommended by Dr. Hadlock and was therefore a violation
of Special Condition #(e). (Tr., p.73, L.24-p.75, L.12; R., p.181.)
Even if there was insufficient evidence for the district court to find that Standley
had violated Special Condition #(e) of his probation, such a finding was not necessary
because Standley still violated Count 2 of the motion to revoke probation when he
violated General Condition #15. Count 2 of the motion to revoke probation alleged that
Standley had violated "General Condition #15 and/.Qr Special Condition #(e);" as such,
the district court could find Standley in violation of Count 2 if he violated either General
Condition #15 or Special Condition #(e). (R., p.191 (emphasis added).) Because there

1

"Exhibits" page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"Supreme Court No. 43024 Exhibits Wesley Gene Standley.pdf."

4

was clear evidence that Standley violated General Condition #15, the court did not err
by finding Standley had violated Count 2. General Condition #15 required Standley to
"meaningfully participate in and successfully complete any treatment, counseling or
other programs deemed beneficial to the Defendant and as directed by the Court or
any agent of the IDOC."

(R., p.187 (emphasis added).)

Standley plainly did not

participate in his treatment as directed, nor can it be said that he meaningfully
participated in his Suboxone treatment because he quit taking the Suboxone as
prescribed and as he agreed in the treatment contract he signed. The district court
specifically found Standley in violation of Count 2, stating:
So there were two components of that order. One component is if
he quits, he violates probation, no question about it. And second, that he
complete the program. Well, there is no question in my mind that Mr.
Standley has not followed that program like he was directed. I don't
care whether Officer Neumeyer thinks it was a violation or not, I don't care
whether Dr. Hadlock thinks it's a violation or not. The question is whether
I think it's a violation. And clearly failing to follow the prescribed routine of
taking two Suboxones a day was the deal. It's not up to Mr. Standley to
make that decision. I could care less whether 90 percent or a hundred
percent of the world failed under these programs and failed to follow the
instructions. That's not the issue. The issue is you were told what to do.
You made a different decision. ... It is an issue, Mr. Standley, very
simply, that you on your own decided to change the program. That
violates this probation, and you are, in fact, in violation of probation on
Count 2.
(Tr., p.112, L.14 - p.114, L.16 (emphasis added).) Because, as stated by the district
court, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Standley had failed to participate in
his treatment as directed, Standley clearly violated General Condition #15 and the
district court did not err in determining that he was in violation of his probation with
respect to Count 2.

5

Even if Standley had not violated Count 2 of the motion for probation violation,
the district court correctly found Standley in violation of his probation because Standley
also violated General Condition #24 (Count 1) of his probation by having unauthorized
contact with another probationer. (R., pp,227-28, 245-46.) At the evidentiary hearing
on this probation violation, Standley "conceded that there was unapproved contact with
Danielle Schreiner" (Tr., p.157, Ls.19-22), and the district court found that the state had
proved the allegation (Tr., p.157, L.24 - p.158, L.3) - a finding Standley has not
challenged on appeal (Appellant's brief, p.13). Standley asserts that any error in the
court's finding that he violated his probation by failing to complete and/or meaningfully
participate in the Suboxone treatment program "is not harmless" because, he claims, "It
does not appear from the record that the court would have revoked [his] probation
based solely on that contact." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) However, this claim is neither a
basis for showing that the court erred by finding Standley had violated his probation, nor
is it supported by the record.
At Standley's sentencing hearing, the district court was extremely clear that any
violation of probation would result in Stand!ey's probation being revoked and the
underlying sentence executed.

The court advised, "You come back on a probation

violation, you're gone. You are locked up for a long time. I intend that. Because I'm
not going to gamble with you" (Tr., p.55, Ls.11-14), and, "I'm here to tell you, Mr.
Standley, that [this] is, in fact, a zero-tolerance probation" (Tr., p.56, Ls.6-7). The court
specifically cautioned, "Here's the things that will get you in trouble: Obviously using
alcohol, it's a trigger; using any drugs, that's clearly going to violate you; associating
with people you shouldn 1t associate with." (Tr., p.58, Ls.13~16 (emphasis added).)

6

Because the district court warned Standley that any probation violation would result in
revocation, that his was a zero-tolerance probation, and that associating with people
with whom he was not authorized to associate would "get [him] in trouble" (Tr., p.58,
L.13), it is very clear that the court would have revoked Standley's probation based
solely on his violation of the single condition prohibiting contact with another
probationer.
Standley next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation, in light of his claims that he did not use or distribute illegal drugs while on
probation, that the text messages and 10-minute conversation with a "drug user" did not
"amount to a rational basis to revoke probation," and that he "never promised to follow
all terms and conditions of the treatment program."

(Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.)

Standley has failed to establish an abuse of discretion
"Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." I.C. § 19"2601 (4).
The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the district court.
State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992). When deciding whether to
revoke probation, the district court must consider "whether the probation [was] achieving
the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of society." Drennen,
122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701.
At the disposition hearing for Standley's probation violations, the district court set
forth its reasons for revoking Standley's probation. (Tr., p.177, L.10- p.181, L.24.) The
state submits that Standley has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons

7

more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the disposition hearing transcript, which
the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's finding that
Standley violated his probation and the district court's order revoking Standley's
probation.
DATED this 9 th day of November, 2015.

~a~RIA~FLEMIN~
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of November, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be placed in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

4.-a~
IA~FLEMING_
Deputy Attorney General
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24

woul<ln•t havo to

25

fol'

rn tJ10 al.tcroati.ve, that: eetac othe.r

pY¢!P'fii1 o\·hH t.h•n j\l • t • andln'J him t.o th@ p1a1n 1 ae the .yc.iur19
wi.n a~1.Q .e-i,.rlltit", thro")tin9 aw,-y tho )l.i,y,

H,. YOU\ll be

•pptopttoc,,
TUB ctJURTl

Thenk yo\l,

covno\,

Plo•ll'f, Hr. stanolcy, lo thero •nythln9 you ,·ould
H>;e 1.;o oay today)

Yo1.Prd not r.oquh'ad to, youir~ C4tUin\y

Voa, vlr,

Fro,i th• l!rot

rw.

Hadlock:.

M tilt' i1t1 t-hll! recent tc><t m.toailQ-4 901:0, you k11ov, t
'1'1t

µpan th<lt -.tt.h old boh,wlorn, but 1tonoU\6lei~o1 it

tho rcaoon l dld11•t do tllot ~•• my olc~rt tlM th•t
110

'AU

on t:ht1t- phone,

TliK

CQUR'l",

Th•nk you.
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lmpottaot iocue to conoldor,

13

dtqldon to nvoko probilt.ion, c;:Qntiriu1;1 pt:qbat1on, or to d:o
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15

under•t•nd tM po,off~tO\·• of that <l1'¢r~Uon, ~hl•h lo ••11

16

torth In c,ao lov,

!,et ~• Hut ••Y to, thU record th•t 1 do !ind tMt

tho viohtiono (n th!•

tQr:tGth$ng cihe h

c••• oro vHHul.

i tblnl< thot•o ••

Sncond, J rocognho that- the

uhurly dhi;rct-ton"-iY with rr.yooU, •n~ l

1 v~nt: to 11.ppronel\ thla cuo, thh diA~o•ttion today

<'vldt!nt luy h~4r1n') 1 ju•I;.. want to ht. yov Jo.now that by no \(J.Y

19

boo~ ond tolx nbout ~h•t 1 ow at tho cxtoMod oorttenolng

20

ho•rin9 In thl• o.,o,

intcll ignnt than M'lybody ln t"ha court.

21

htr~, ond, I b--<tll.ov4 1 ~aktd ct.:-t

or

S\.lhoxonn soan, thM I tJ ...,hilt t:hcy v,n·l!-, thQY vorQ e-Xt\'"a.

<••• ono,

\olhen 1

I ktnd oe looked at It ao • vtotory

t\Y •obr.!.i,.t:y, blJ\ wlt:ho\Jt quution, without q,.ieattQO I

n .,,.

22

four-plu••tlsht to aervo.

23

rroh~t.illin..

24
25

heard Ito"' D<, Hadlook,

w-a Ji~erd

••t•nolvo,

w••

Th• ttate wUkad In

to Jop-on • Cour•plu11 .. four to

Tho dof<n••

l.t'Offl )oil!,

teotHled torl•Y •. thot

<•••

ln •n<l nkod •• for

r11.nn •• 1ue:e goot:l.t:titm 1o1ho

my eoMont •Mue •••ing hlr> •'l•tn,

110 hoord o\ l kinda o! t0Rtl<11ony about
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llttlo bit d!lleront th>n, ir•nkly, either counncl h.. and 90

11nd '1'.6&na ~"' t trytno to plAy you O'r'" do r \hink J 1 m fl".Ore
Ao fbr t'IA tho tXtt •

pt

But you know, th•t vn the tint •nd th, only ona

Th•~ i • About •II t g•t.
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'°)co,,.• to, IC you vlah.
THR DRPl<IID>JlT,

,should haY4 uud bl'lttb\" eoeumn\cit.ton •kill.a vlth
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t ...,ou~d roquont that my al tent bo
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2 v..Loh.tt\ina,

so

10~.• pretty eoiry

KonQk', •n &d~iot.; h,1.is lo be givon IIX)ro th~n 4iS da.yo on p.roba\.lon

l h•Uovo lt hoo been no ••erot that thO i>ro,eoution,

a

tto pol~ ~n enot1Uouu tine ~nd
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matter,
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ho"' >fr, at~ndl~y had chAi\!,04 hlts llfe, he

2
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ho htid ha.," chnn, ho t..•.00 1 t. 9ol11g !Jca~•k, on and. Qn and on ind
ort.

4

Stato 1 0 tCCOtr..11()1U)atlon a-nd l,JpQOCd vhat, in whn l \Jill fu\\y

6

ad;11it ic ont

And nt thq ond Of that aent~nctno hc!rlru) 1 t r,&j4¢tl!ld the

t>t the moot Dtac<)nia~ prebation ord~wB HU1t

8
7
8
9
10
11

no<;avoe c r:o4rt~., contract wlth t-0.', St1111cfley.

12

~V 4h' huu-,d in thlo ooui:-t,
hct,),(

dqn~ with diug9 1

\/,'111

yearu

t h,vo

I• vc l>can ot th!o for (l,:vi::n ant.! "

nrson.

OQ)l ilU .. Q.19t:tJ.<:t j\ldgd, 80 I'VO

lot(>(

c."lnen, ir-po,cd A lc!lt of probiit.tqna •nd , lo\, of p,n1tantLc1ry
zu:rnton~c11 1 and PH b& the fir•t t.o id.d.H ~hi, h

.iit.,out th't
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rcnttcntlcry to Rorvo th.h aentt-ncc.

7

•••oolatlonn,

8
0

wu \.-Or!dn9,

contlnu•d to uuo •hlle ~• wau out oC jail,

Md th,t co,t•lnly

But. l a:lc:o r~~e~l)ar ~t. th& ond of that

h: to hh cJ'edit,,

u·ntt1noi.itg hu.dn(] t "14:nt: rJ~-.n J l.1vnrJry lht of th1ngn, and 1
.sa!i;i 1 )h', Standloy 1 lt you do thh, "lhH. .,_.iU I do tQ yo1,1.?

the anevcr ~v~ry tin.e: w~s,

yQii

one of thoae thinga w,a,e

Qno of tlloao thing• ••• tailin9 to ah!do by th•

pro;1rain that 1 ..,.io convincod, at lc;io.t by tha to11th1ony I tud 1

~ou~go, then

¢(

t,1~Ht ~

llhoio Utony oc othoY

of whioh ha• not been t•lkod •bout.

thl o, ;nd it yo" .. 11nlean I •tn not r4!!.r.tn\berina tbot: l!entcnet ng
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12
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hO.dny, at thi,, vey:y ond T ooid, lS yoa'tll to llfat or 1 t you
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nQ•t.olcr.,ric~ fll"ObHt¢t\,
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don I t w•nt to do tho probation oondlt !on•, l 1 11 sond you eo tho
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You %no..,, 11vc cftt.in wondr.red 'llhcther lt,,. vf:!ry
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har-d<1ot: ona thcrtJ wa11.

And th~. r"!eson for thit i.& VOct'Y sb9l.t:

Hr. St.andloy say11, I want to bq.

pon juet lHe tho St•to itt>:v.
¢:n px-o't>M!¢1l,

Tho cortt.nit:t ..,;11

£v,otyb-ody ',IMt,.s t.o lie- on

Uo~ t1\J-rprit1in9.

pYoh•t (on.
'ThH

vu

bala.~ccd ts.ga!nat, rolly, two thin9w thit. l

19

conoid~1·ad at that tiru!!,
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ox.ton1Jivc crimin,,l ht at.ory of th!a dehndant, servln!J t,t~ in
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(ft.ato ~Or.11 1 tcd'&l'$l paoa, And i,,~c-ond, the very naturt Qf thlA
¢Ja,.(yo, whiqh lo pa~.l!iocoton '-.lth intent- to Joltvor.

23

h•v• ilnY ~vidonc:,o bofoto tto tot:lay thill; Hr, $1;0:odloy 1 a etUl ln

24

thtt dru') bUJltteu,

25

uy thor,t ll l\O evld~nue o( that,

one: 1 thti 4!!Xtti1A!v~, .1r't ¢y Vh"',

T don 1 t

In hct, J'd hilVO to

I don't );now that,

I hJVQ' no tvldtllC:O l;ha.t: he.'&
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26

t.hlnga, 11cme or whkh dohnu; t'01J.011ol ttllk,d ibcut today, tilOIO

1 thlok l road• It •h•olutoly <lo•< th•t thlo

w.erititnolng Qpt!on to ht de(onJooto knoy 01tt1<;it,ly

H thh wa11 • c11ue involving, w,11, th• tlt!crnl.f;nt

dldn't t•k• hlo M6dle,tlon r!9bt, . , h• didn't uo to a progua
oneo or twico, c,r h4 trtaQo a pha.n$ call to eio~l!lbody he ahouldn 1 \:.
ffi\v~, l 110vl.d have. to agn:i'-' w\th that, that 'ii0u1d not 1n ittolf

fuotify lmpoo1tion ot th• ooM~noo,
deal Ing with in lhl• ca••·

intclliaont itiin,
b\Jt1ln.1:ti0 1

4

.and I \I.le not .ibout to l~t you go boe>c lnto d0Jn9 What you verc

5

doiny beforo,
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7
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I

That. 1 1 an unfC>rt~nAtc thing ln the drug

hco.11Jac n:nort pcop\d. got e.<Jiy \11th e. >.o~ of th1n90,,

rou,

Hb~O

/Uld 90000 vl>ltl

1'hon 110 uort.dn thLn!31J thllt;.

no mll\t.i.ko about. it,

You t•il•d,
ai

things tod~y, that'• Wh1,' tltd. Sta.ti$ lo1H.: \.'jd~c.

Okay?
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11
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.ao?.o oC tho t.hlt19A th&t r

13

oourta ol tho 6late fool thl• io l~propor, oo bo it,
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15

revet•ed, il1\d '-'•' ll do thte casa over a9ain
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t

(Onoldar ln dlopoo1tlon hootillg•, and t '"' ooing to tell you
cono:idl'!dng,

r kuow Dar,hllQ SChT(,'1ne,:,

tC the

apvo.u..,,c.o
I ')1 get

1t10~~~.1y,

Silo'& OHO o( rr,,y

1\ftn 1Mny rider.11, l put htJ'. Jnt:o dr"g r;ou,:t,.,

And r am partieul,.~ly offended ln thh

Q\\G~

t.h~t vo had f.

do(of\dant Yho

'l(llO

t;Qurt

and that 1CJ ox-1ctly wh,:it happoncd ho~tt.

D}'Dtea1; 1

trying to tNani{)uhte 4omtbody in the rlnio

l don 1t

cir• 1<hother she ~oox th• Soboxono plllo or whothor eho didn't,
ThAI;. convu·utlon vh01Jld nover had happon~<l.

t"4, Hk". st,1\(ll~y, 1.hH you
ol U f.6 t)lat yllu 1v~ Hv,ed

uo
f()'t"

tt

fodic.atou t<>

co11tinvin9 to UV!) \;h~ ,~12;0 t.yve
y1:•ra •ml yeato aod y.e,rv and

yoor•,

doaHng

1-la~t Lewh tn anoth<>t o( my ptobat!onerfl.

l put hlll\

thi-ae

"""'~{J

ago,

Yo"

lhlok, voU, Jud9•, you dido•t tind hi«1 in vlol•~l~n or
pr<ibiltion ror h«vlng t>Ontact: with Hr, LewU, but l think th•t

4

~tin~e the poil\t.

5

h•o had • drug ·••ooiatton vlth H•tt Les lo, Vhloh 1u th•

6

ovldence. t1lu t han.rd ln court. t.od:Jy, uflin9 dtu9.e in 2013, tive-r

10
11

The poirtt he:t~ h

thti'I, vhy would onvono vho

a phone Nll to aomoboJy lro" t11ulr P••t?

U thilt

\;onv$rnl;.1on had soniJ on toe ,nothe:f 1', 10, 30 mlnuteu, l
thln1';

~(I

VQV.ld h1v<1 ,nother r-oa1,1lt, in thit quo in te.c~e or

peob•tlon vlol,t.ion, out thH' • not tho •vid•nco ~• havo,

Th•

ix>lnt l'n ... king haro it, vtry •linply, why would • d•fon~•nt
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13

drug world, 90 bocl( end 1Hart ('UUtool~tlng with llOmtbody \lh0 1 8

14

dooply Involved In tho drug woeld, •nd he knnwn lt?
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knowo hate

drugv igain, l ~on'~ }mo')(,
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h••· Y•t to nt•k• \hO COICll\NOnt. to
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'fhat 1 a wlW yau'l:c ootno to the pen t-od<ly,
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prQVQl1\.

\.lhO h/\t tot•Hy chi'll\ged hh 11h 1 \lhO vants to 9et

J

Q\lt

ot. tho

HhHMr h•

tolon. or whothor ho kno..,.·o h1t 1 n trying tn Mll

\Iha\ all oC that talh me, Mr, st,ndloy, lo tl"t you

lovo your p.. , b•hlnd.
1hc quutl,:,n her~ h

Mt that you dldo•t do thing, llh~ ncv dn,g c~IM• ond thiO ••d
that,

TM purpo,o oC probation, •~009 ether thingo, l• to
pou,pl~ t:,ua co"".m.itt.109 crhmt),

ptQb.it;.ion vlth

H days into

ft

a. Ht, 1n1ntonc@ ha.ngtng ovoi your head, I guaoo,

,,.ant nothin~ t<> you,

Vo,1r p)'.'Ol)A~ion St tbVOked in this cuo, tho 1;011ttt'\CO
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•t a probation evi4Mt:Ory he,ntng, arHJ i 1.Htlrt• t. <:ondd1;11: t:houo

probl\tlonora.
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,t,nd, •nd th•t, • wh•t 1 Intend to do vHh thlo doCen~ailt.
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tor

Whl!

Hko you••• prejudging Q•Ooo, but I think it•o o v!oblo
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••t you up to ean.
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judgo to ••Y thO•o Hnd of thing• bec,uno It ••~•• you oound
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